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COMMENTS

DEALER PARTICIPATION IN AUTOMOBILE FINANCE
CHARGES: A REPLY
PHILIP D. PECAR*
No extensive rebuttal of Mr. Hardy's comment on dealer participation,1 which apparently is inspired by a favorable reference in an Indiana
Law Journal note to the activities of the Big Three of automobile financing,2 will be attempted. However, certain clarification and reenunciation of positions is necessary. Perhaps unintentionally, but with
great specificity, Mr. Hardy intimates that the criticized note unequivocally approves the activities of the Big Three in all its endeavors. The
brunt of the attack is borne by a two-sentence segment of the note, which
merely summarized authoritative statements on the subject.'
The comment and the note fail to meet on a common ground. The
note taken in its entirety at no point pretended to whitewash the Big Three
of its "original sins." To the contrary, the author of the note attempted
painstakingly to present both sides of a controversial issue, analyzing impartially, in his opinion, the advantages and shortcomings of dealer participation control; necessarily in such a study the roles of all parties must
be considered.
In curing any impression of partisanship which the note conveyed, it
must be emphasized that it clearly outlines the case of United States v.
General Motors Corporation,4 upon which Mr. Hardy relies so heavily for
authority,5 as well as the cases against the Ford and Chrysler corporations ;6 the fact that the automobile companies admitted certain abuses, as
* Member, Indiana and Illinois Bars; formerly Senior Associate, INDIANA LAw

author of the Note, Is Control of DealerParticipationA Necessary Adjunct to
Regulation of Installment Sales Finanwing?, 28 IND. LJ. 641 (1953); currently serving
with United States Air Force. This comment in no way reflects the views of the military service.
1. Hardy, Another View of Dealer Participationin Autovwbile Finance Charges,
30 IND. LJ. 311 (1955) (this issue).
2. Note, Is Control of Dealer Participationa Necessary Adjimct to Regulation of
Installment Sales Financing?,28 IND. L.J. 641 (1953), with special reference to the observation that "the Big Three has been instrumental in disinfecting the entirei [automobile]
industry of many abusive practices." Id. at 659.
3. See notes 12-14 infra and accompanying text.
4. Note, supra note 2, at 646-647 and n.32, 35 and 36.
5. Mr. Hardy consistently turns to that case to substantiate his claims. The General
Motors case speaks for itself. Other studies conducted during the same period as the research leading to the antitrust case and reaching completion at about the same time proJOURNAL;

vide much valuable information on the same subject. See PLUMMER AND YOUNG, SALES
FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES (1940), and FTC REPORT ON MOTOR
VEHICLE INDUSTRY (1940).
6. Note, spra note 2, at 646-647 and n.32, 34 and 35.
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is lucidly illustrated by the ultimate resolution of the cases into consent
decrees, is set out in detail.'
The note also enumerates some of the
methods adopted by the automobile companies in their eagerness to
monopolize all phases of automobile distribution, from manufacturing to
selling to financing to insuring.'
Furthermore, it underlines the great
threat to the smaller financing companies from the activities of the Big
Three.9 The note even speculates as to the consequences of a continued
governmental laissez faire policy as to dealer participation," precisely
designating Mr. Hardy's panacea, the statutory weapons of monopoly
destruction, as a potential mode of attack.1 1
If the note stopped with a presentation of the industry's Big Threeinstigated ills, clearly the nationals would have solid footing for an assault
on the author's partisan offering. But the note proceeds to credit the
large companies with taking an active position in "disinfecting the entire
industry of many abusive practices." One example of this is presented
by GMAC's "Six Percent Plan."' 2 For years students of automobile
financing have cried out for legislation compelling finance companies to
itemize succinctly the individual charges which comprise the time sale
price of an automobile. In recent years many states have adopted disclosure provisions. Yet in 1935 GMAC instituted their program, which
attempted to teach the public to compute finance charges. Although the
plan was ultimately throttled by a Federal Trade Commission declaration
that GMAC was engaging in deceptive advertising, the Commission admitted that, if the plan were comprehended by the public, overcharges
and "packs" could easily be detected. While the intended result of the
plan may have benefited GMAC financially, at the same time a pioneer
attempt had been made to educate the public to avoid abuses.
But this is not the sole contribution to the cleansing of the industry
by the large companies. Although this comment is by no means a defense
of the nationals, undisputed facts must be presented; the Big Three, over
the years, consistently has maintained finance charges at lower levels than
7. Id. at n.35 and 36.
8. As to the manufacturers' coercion of their dealers to compel them to sell their
automobile paper to the affiliated finance companies, see Note, supra note 2, at 646. That
note also pointed out that the consent decree might prove completely ineffectual in the
prevention of coercive practices. Id. at 647. This tends to agree with Mr. Hardy's
opinion of the consent decree. Hardy, siqpra note 1, at 317.
The Note also details manufacturers' attempts to control the insurance aspects of
automobile sales. Note, supra note 2, at 648-649 and n.37-43, 46, 47.
9. Id. at 655-659.
10. Id. at 660.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 644 n.18, 646, n.29. And see FTC REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY
941-945 (1940).
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have the independent finance companies, 3 while GMAC has offered the
lowest dealer participation. 4 Construing Mr. Hardy's silence on that
point as an admission, it may be assumed that he concedes that, at least on
the surface, the nationals have kept finance charges and "kickbacks" low.
He does, however, point out that this superficial picture is "gravely
misleading."' 5
The Journalnote made no effort to deal extensively with the "monopoly" aspects of the sales financing picture, but since Mr. Hardy uses
that note as a springboard for the presentation of his solution to the financing problem, the termination of all relationship between General
Motors and its acceptance corporation, certain flaws in his theory must be
pointed out. He indicates that because of the associations between the
manufacturers and the large financing companies, no comparison can be
made between the rates of the nationals and the independents; this of
course is because the manufacturer's acquisition methods keep costs to the
nationals at a minimum. He also states that a high finance cost can always be concealed in the purchase price of the car.' 6 This argument
tacitly emphasizes the defect in Mr. Hardy's theory.
The automobile industry is a "brand name" industry. The current
sale of any automobile can be directly attributed to years of reputationbuilding. Extensive advertising, intensive research and development, and
the manufacture of marketable goods have created a demand for the
products of certain manufacturers. Each company's product is unique in
certain characteristics. This individuality of product makes for pricing
freedom, limited only by competition. Mr. Hardy admits that there is
enough leeway within the competition-imposed limits to allow for the inclusion of financing costs in the sales price of the automobile. If this is
13. A 1938 study indicated that the national companies consistently extracted lower
finance charges than did the smaller companies. Note, supra note 2, at 649 n.44. And see
PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 5, at 211, Table 55.
14. Note, supra note 2, at 646 n.30. And see FTC REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 959, Table 160.

15. Mr. Hardy, supra note 1, at 315, states that the Big Three have sought to limit
dealer participation because of their fear of entering the competitive bidding for automobile paper. This fails to explain recent activities of the nationals. For example, Universal Commercial Investment Trust Corporation took an aggressive part in the court
battle over the constitutionality of Indiana's Retail Installment Sales Act, which attempted
to limit dealer participation. CIT, intervening on behalf of the plaintiff, sought to
enjoin enforcement of the limitation. The court agreed with the plaintiff that the limitation was a form of legislative price-fixing and declared it unconstitutional. Department
of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E.2d 629 (1952). For a discussion
of this case see Note, supra note 2, at 650-654.
16. Mr. Hardy's comment, paraphrasing the court in the General Motors case, states
that the "GMAC object and achievement was profit," Hardy, supra note 1, at 317, while
the Note intimates that "augmentation of General Motors auto sales is a distinctive objective of the competitive policy of GMAC ...

"

Note, supra note 2, at 646.
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so, and if the prime objective of manufacturer-controlled finance companies is to obtain large profits rather than to implement automobile
selling, why do the manufacturers need affiliated finance companies at
all? Why can they not secure those extra profits simply by raising the
purchase price of the car, without increasing the complexity of their
organization, by establishing subsidiary finance companies? The answer
of course is that they could, easily enough, because of the uniqueness of
their products. Therefore, to destroy the controlled finance companies,
following this bit of logic, would only result in higher automobile sales
prices, allowing the manufacturers to milk a segment of the market, which
apparently has been neglected, the cash purchaser. In other words, the
automobile manufacturers could, in today's market, at their desire extract
higher prices from the cash as well as the time purchaser.
This comment does not pretend to offer a solution to the problem.
At this point though, it is clear that the abuses infesting automobile financing are not due to the connections existing between certain manufacturers and finance companies, but instead are attributable to the peculiar
nature of the automobile industry itself. As suggested, General Motors
could maintain operations at the same profit level it enjoys today even
without the affiliated finance company. To break the ties that bind the
companies would fail to solve a difficult problem. Since the consumer is
of primary concern in our considerations, attempts should be made to
protect him. Even if the independent company were permitted to operate
without competition from the manufacturers and their subsidiaries, as
long as the manufacturer can increase automobile purchase prices, the
consumer is left exposed to high charges, whether they are called finance
charges or concealed in the purchase price of the automobile.
It is not the intention in this comment to call for price fixing or any
facet of price stabilization in the automobile industry; competition itself
may be sufficient to keep prices from reaching exorbitant levels. However, it should be stressed that the problem existing in the financing phase
,of automobile sales is directly attributable to the intrinsic nature of the
automobile industry, and that an attempt to cure financing ills must be
concentrated at the root of the industrial tree rather than at the base of
a sickly branch.
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